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Predictive processing (PP) is a paradigm in computational and cognitive neuroscience
that has recently attracted significant attention across domains, including psychology,
robotics, artificial intelligence and philosophy. It is often regarded as a fresh and possibly
revolutionary paradigm shift, yet a handful of authors have remarked that aspects of PP
seem reminiscent of the work of 18th century philosopher Immanuel Kant. To date there
have not been any substantive discussions of how exactly PP links back to Kant. In this
article, I argue that several core aspects of PP were anticipated by Kant (1996/1787)
in his works on perception and cognition. Themes from Kant active in PP include:
(1) the emphasis on “top-down” generation of percepts; (2) the role of “hyperpriors”;
(3) the general function of “generative models”; (4) the process of “analysis-by-synthesis”
and (5) the crucial role of imagination in perception. In addition to these, I also point out
that PP echoes Kant’s general project in that it aims to explain how minds track causal
structure in the world using only sensory data, and that it uses a reverse-engineer or
“top-down” method of analysis. I then locate a possible source of Kant’s influence on PP
by tracing the paradigm back to Hermann von Helmholtz, who saw himself as providing
a scientific implementation of Kant’s conclusions. I conclude by arguing that PP should
not be regarded as a new paradigm, but is more appropriately understood as the latest
incarnation of an approach to perception and cognition initiated by Kant and refined by
Helmholtz.
Keywords: predictive processing, Kant, top-down processing, hyperpriors, generative model, schemata, analysis
by synthesis, imagination in perception
INTRODUCTION
‘‘Let’s put it this way: Kant knew nothing about the platypus, and that should not worry us, but if the
platypus is to solve its own identity crisis, it ought to know something about Kant.’’
—Umberto Eco (2000), Kant and the Platypus.
Predictive processing (PP) is a paradigm in computational and cognitive neuroscience
proposing that ‘‘perception involves the use of a unified body of acquired knowledge
(a multi-level ‘‘generative model’’) to predict the incoming sensory barrage’’ (Clark, 2015c,
p. 5). PP has recently attracted significant attention across domains, including psychology,
linguistics, robotics, artificial intelligence and philosophy (see Andy Clark’s BBS target article
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(Clark, 2013) with dozens of responses, as well as the Frontiers
Research Topic (Frontiers in Theoretical and Philosophical
Psychology, 2013)). PP combines and builds upon previous
ideas about the role of ‘‘unconscious inference’’ in perception
(Helmholtz, 1925; Barlow, 1961; Gregory, 1970), the process
of ‘‘analysis by synthesis’’ in psychology (Neisser, 1967), the
‘‘predictive coding’’ approach in neuroscience (Srinivasan et al.,
1982; Rao and Ballard, 1999; Huang and Rao, 2011) and
‘‘generative models’’ and related probabilistic computational
principles (MacKay, 1956; Mumford, 1992; Dayan et al., 1995;
Hinton, 2007a,b; Tenenbaum et al., 2011). By integrating all
of these approaches into a unified, hierarchical, probabilistic
model of brain function, the PP paradigm promises to
offer ‘‘a computationally tractable version of the so-called
Bayesian Brain Hypothesis’’ (Clark, 2013, p. 191)1. In this
article I focus on recent ‘‘big picture’’ formulations of PP
that attempt to offer a unified theory of brain function,
exemplified by the work of Friston (2003, 2005); Friston
et al. (2006), as recently outlined by philosophers Clark (2013)
and Hohwy (2013).
While opinions differ concerning the ‘‘implied vision
of mind’’ contained within the PP paradigm (Clark, 2015c,
p. 3), several authors have made quick remarks stating that
certain aspects of PP seem reminiscent of 18th century
philosopher Immanuel Kant’s work on cognition and
perception. For example, Clark (2013, p. 196) remarks that
at certain points PP can evoke an ‘‘almost Kantian feel,’’
and Gładziejewski (2016, p. 16) states that PP ‘‘presents
us with a view of perception as Kantian in spirit.’’ PP
literature has been cited in support of the argument that
recent cognitive science is outlining a ‘‘Kantian brain’’
(Fazelpour and Thompson, 2015). The PP paradigm has
even been labeled (pejoratively) as a ‘‘neo-neo-Kantian view
of the relationship between mind and world’’ (Anderson
and Chemero, 2013, p. 204). Hohwy even notes that
‘‘there is certainly a distinct Kantian element’’ to the PP
paradigm, but goes on to merely mention a few of Kant’s
ideas in a list before truncating the list with ‘‘etc.’’ (Hohwy,
2013, p. 5).
With this article I hope to contribute a closer examination
of the relationship between the PP paradigm and the ideas
of Kant. I pick up where Hohwy left off with ‘‘etc.’’ by
presenting and defending clear links between specific elements
of PP and key ideas proposed by Kant. First, I point out
that Kant was an early pioneer of the ‘‘top-down’’ analytical
method common to PP theorists, and that, like PP, he used this
analytical method to investigate how minds can track causal
structure. Next, I present five distinct components of PP that
have significant links with five key ideas proposed by Kant.
Finally, I argue that the similarities between Kant and PP
should not come as a surprise if we consider the fact that
PP is historically connected to Kant through Hermann von
Helmholtz.
1However, PP should not be conflated with broader and more general
Bayesian approaches to cognition (Griffiths et al., 2008; Blokpoel et al., 2012;
Friston, 2012).
REVERSE-ENGINEERING, TOP-DOWN
ANALYSIS AND KANT’S
TRANSCENDENTAL METHOD OF
ARGUMENT
In the field of electrical engineering, reverse-engineering is
defined as ‘‘the act of creating a set of specifications for a
piece of hardware by someone other than the original designers,
primarily based upon analyzing and dimensioning a specimen
or collection of specimens’’ (Rekoff, 1985, p. 244). To reverse-
engineer a system is to start with the complete functioning system
and apply a functional analysis from the ‘‘top-down’’ in an effort
to discover how its parts achieve its overall function. Cognitive
scientists commonly attempt to reverse-engineer the mind—a
method often termed ‘‘top-down analysis’’—by observing the
fully functioning perceptual-cognitive system in an attempt to
discover the necessary components that must be required for
such a system to operate in the way that it does (Pinker, 1999;
Griffiths et al., 2010; Tenenbaum et al., 2011). Contrast this with
the forward engineering approach, which for cognitive science
means a ‘‘bottom-up approach, beginning with a characterization
of neural mechanisms and exploring what macro-level functional
phenomena might emerge’’ (Griffiths et al., 2010, p. 357).
While theorists working within the PP paradigm commonly
use both bottom-up and top-down methods of analysis, use
of the top-down ‘‘reverse-engineer the mind’’ approach is
characteristic of PP’s overall analytical methodology (Hohwy,
2013).
Kant adopted a top-down analytical approach as a central
guiding principle, known as the ‘‘transcendental method of
argument’’ (Kant, 1996/1787; Kitcher, 1996; Brook, 2007; Stern,
2015). A transcendental argument justifies some concept or
claim by showing that it is a necessary condition on the
possibility of some other fact of experience (Stroud, 1968;
Stern, 2015). Kant is recognized as the first in Western
philosophy to fully leverage transcendental arguments, and this
is often cited as a defining characteristic of what sets Kant’s
analytical methodology apart from that of his contemporaries
(Kitcher, 1996; Brook, 2007; Stern, 2015). Kitcher (1996)
points out that Kant pioneered what is now being called the
top-down approach in cognitive science. ‘‘In contemporary
terminology, where much current research is descriptive and
‘‘bottom-up’’, Kant’s approach was ‘‘top-down’’. He tried
to analyze the sorts of processes that were necessary for
genuine cognition to be possible’’ (Kitcher, 1996, p. xliv).
Recently, Griffiths et al. (2010, p. 357) call for a top-down
analytical approach to studying perception and cognition,
stating that ‘‘cognitive science aims to reverse-engineer the
mind. . . a top-down analysis of cognition starting with the
function of cognitive processes. . . yields greater flexibility
for exploring the representations and inductive biases that
underlie human cognition’’. Kant made a similar call in
his 1783 Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will
Be Able to Come Forward as a Science: ‘‘We will start
from the position that. . . cognition is actual; but we must
nonetheless next investigate the ground of this possibility,
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and ask: how this cognition is possible. . . ’’ (Kant, 1783, sec.
4:276). Brook (2007) argues that Kant should be recognized
as the ‘‘grandfather of cognitive science’’ in part because he
pioneered the application of this style of top-down analysis
to the study of cognition and perception. This fact supports
the case that PP has roots in Kant, since some of the
strongest advocates of the top-down analytical approach in
cognitive science are those working on PP theories (Hohwy,
2013).
The ‘‘top-down’’ or ‘‘reverse-engineer’’ method of analysis—a
defining characteristic of the analytical methodology
of probabilistic approaches to cognition (and PP in
particular)—was pioneered by Kant and central to his
philosophical method. However, top-down analysis cannot
get off the ground without a clearly defined functional specimen
to serve as the ‘‘top’’ for the reverse-engineering process. In the
next section I argue that Kant and PP both define the primary
function of cognition and perception as the ability to track causal
structure without direct access to real-world causes.
HOW CAN MINDS TRACK CAUSAL
STRUCTURE?
For Bayesian models of cognition and perception in general,
‘‘the big question is this: how does the human mind go beyond
the data of experience?’’ (Griffiths et al., 2008, p. 59). In such
models, including PP theories, the causes of sensations are
commonly referred to as ‘‘hidden causes’’ or ‘‘distal causes’’
(Rao and Ballard, 1999; Feldman and Friston, 2010; Battaglia
et al., 2012; Clark, 2013; Hohwy, 2013; Purves et al., 2015). They
are hidden because the only ‘‘data’’ that brains have to work
with are the effects of stimulated sense organs. ‘‘In biological
perception, the brain directly measures sensory cues but does
not directly measure external world properties’’ (Battaglia et al.,
2012). The PP paradigm is ultimately aimed at explaining
how brains can track real-world causes using only sensory
effects (Körding et al., 2007; Clark, 2013; Hohwy, 2013; Purves
et al., 2015). ‘‘The problem of perception is the problem of
using the effects—that is, the sensory data that is all the
brain has access to—to figure out the causes’’ (Hohwy, 2013,
p. 13). Clark gives a similar characterization. ‘‘For, the task
of the brain, when viewed from a certain distance, can seem
impossible: it must discover information about the likely causes
of impinging signals without any form of direct access to
their source’’ (Clark, 2013, p. 183). This position is what
Hohwy (2013) terms ‘‘the skull-bound brain’’ and what Clark
(2013, p. 183) characterizes as the ‘‘view from inside the
black box’’.
The PP paradigm thus aims to provide a neurally plausible
set of mechanisms by which brains accomplish causal inference
and overcome the challenges of induction (Friston, 2003; Hohwy,
2013). Induction itself has enjoyed a central role in the history of
science, philosophy and philosophy of science. ‘‘David Hume is
a pivotal character in this regard’’ (Hohwy, 2013, p. 6). Hume
developed arguments that challenged the existence of necessary
causal connections between sensations (Hume, 1739, bk. I, part
III, section vi). The PP paradigm has been framed as an answer
to Hume’s challenge in that it aims to offer an account for
how causal structure is extracted from statistical regularities that
occur in sensory stimulation (Hohwy, 2012, 2013; Dennett, 2013;
Flores, 2015). PP’s answer to Humean problems of induction
rests on proposed neural computations based on Bayesian
principles (Knill and Pouget, 2004; Blokpoel et al., 2012; Hohwy,
2013; Clark, 2015a; Mikowski, 2016). Interestingly, Bayesian
principles themselves arose in part as a response to Hume’s
problem of induction (Gillies, 1987; McGrayne, 2011). Thomas
Bayes’ ideas on probability were not published until after his
death when his friend Richard Price presented an essay to the
Royal Society of London, which included Bayes’ ideas along
with some important additions by Price (Bayes and Price, 1763;
Gillies, 1987; McGrayne, 2011). At first glance, Price did not
think much of Bayes’ essay on the probability of causes. However,
‘‘once Price decided Bayes’ essay was the answer to Hume’s attack
on causation, he began preparing it for publication’’ (McGrayne,
2011, pp. 10–11; see also Gillies, 1987, p. 325). Thus, without
Price’s Hume-driven motivations, Bayes’ ideas would probably
not have been published.
Contemporaneous with the Bayes/Price effort to respond to
Hume, a quite different but no less influential response was
in the works—from Kant. Kant advanced a unique, elaborate,
and massively influential answer to Hume (Guyer, 2008).
Kant’s ‘‘critical period’’, during which he developed his most
important work, began as a direct and explicit response to
Hume’s challenge (Kant, 1783; Hatfield, 2006; Guyer, 2008). Kant
famously recounts that it was Hume, who ‘‘first interrupted my
dogmatic slumber and gave a completely different direction to
my researches’’ (Kant, 1783, sec. 4:260). Kant goes on to explain
that, once he finally embraced Hume’s challenge and was led to
the conclusion that causal connections must have their origin
in minds and not in real-world properties, he was driven to
inquire what other aspects of experience might arise in this way,
and that it was this initial inquiry that eventually led him to
the conclusions of his transcendental idealism (Kant, 1783, sec.
4:260). Indeed, the problem of causation that Hume raised was so
central to Kant’s project that Kant did not hesitate to characterize
his entire Critique of Pure Reason simply as the ‘‘elaboration
of the Humean problem in its greatest possible amplification’’
(Kant, 1783, sec. 4:261).
Throughout his critical period work, Kant
maintained a sharp epistemic divide between sensory
experiences—‘‘appearances’’—and the actual causes of
sensations—‘‘things in themselves’’ (Kant, 1996/1787; Allison,
2004; Stang, 2016). ‘‘What may be the case regarding objects
in themselves and apart from. . . our sensibility remains to
us entirely unknown. All we know is the way in which we
perceive them.’’ (Kant, 1996/1787, sec. A42). This thesis, which
Kant dubbed ‘‘transcendental idealism’’, has generated much
interpretive debate and controversy (Allison, 2004; Rohlf,
2016). Paton et al. (2013, p. 222) insist that, although some
authors might downplay it, PP ‘‘does convey a somehow indirect
mind-world relation’’. This is presumably what Anderson
and Chemero (2013, p. 204) refer to when they label PP as a
‘‘neo-neo-Kantian view of the relationship between mind and
world’’.
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Thus, Kant and PP each aim to offer detailed accounts of
how minds track ‘‘hidden causes’’ using only the data from the
senses, and they both develop these accounts using methods of
top-down analysis in an attempt to reverse-engineer perception
and cognition. How do their accounts compare? In what follows
I argue that if we compare some of the major theoretical
postulates that Kant and PP each propose, we find that their
kinship runs deeper than the general similarities outlined so
far.
In the following sections I present five specific theoretical
components of PP and show how each is connected to one of
five specific key ideas proposed by Kant: (1) PP’s advocacy for
a reversal of the traditional picture of perception is linked to
Kant’s self-described ‘‘Copernican revolution’’; (2) PP’s notion
of hyperpriors is linked to Kant’s idea of ‘‘forms of appearances’’;
(3) PP’s principles of generative models are linked to Kant’s
concept of ‘‘schemata’’; (4) PP’s analysis-by-synthesis is linked
to Kant’s proposal that analysis proceeds by synthesis; and
(5) PP’s claim that imagination is required for perception
is linked to Kant’s claim that imagination is required for
perception.
PP’s “REVERSAL” IS KANT’s
“COPERNICAN REVOLUTION”
When considered within the short history of today’s cognitive
science, PP offers a radical and revisionary stance on the
relationship between percepts and external objects. A common
strategy that many authors use for explaining this distinctive
difference is to contrast PP with ‘‘standard,’’ ‘‘classical’’ or
‘‘traditional’’ approaches to perception and cognition (Engel
et al., 2001; Lee and Mumford, 2003; Yuille and Kersten, 2006;
Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2015a,b). PP literature often describes
‘‘traditional’’ approaches as those that assume that perception is
a passive process by which features of objects in the environment
are detected by the sense organs and encoded into the nervous
system and assembled in a bottom-up fashion. PP rejects this
bottom-up conception of perception. ‘‘PP turns a traditional
picture of perception on its head’’ (Clark, 2015a, p. 51; emphasis
mine). PP urges that psychology and neuroscience would
make better progress on the problems of perception if they
would instead assume that brains actively generate percepts
in a top-down manner, not by accumulating and combining
input signals, but rather, by issuing predictions or accounts
of the current state of the input signals based on hierarchical
generative models that rely on prior probabilities and likelihood
estimates (Kersten et al., 2004; Friston, 2005; Hohwy, 2013;
Clark, 2015a). As repeatedly emphasized by many authors,
this is not just a small modification of traditional accounts of
perception.
In fact, it profoundly reverses how we conceive our relation to
the world through the senses. A standard conception is that the
senses convey a rich signal that somehow represents a worldly
state of affairs, which the brain is passively soaking up in a
bottom-up manner. On the [PP] view, this picture is reversed.
The rich representation of worldly states of affairs is signalled
in the top-down predictions of sensory input, maintained by the
perceptual hierarchy in the brain (Hohwy, 2013, p. 47; emphasis
mine).
On the PP account, the cortical hierarchy is constantly
generating predictions from the top down that attempt to
account for the causes of the bottom-up sensory stimulation
(Friston, 2005). ‘‘This means that perceptual content is the
predictions of the currently best hypothesis about the world’’
(Hohwy, 2013, p. 48). Hohwy (2013, p. 2) captures the overall
upshot of this reversal of standard thinking about perception
with a catchy slogan. ‘‘The sensory input to the brain does
not shape perception directly: sensory input is better and more
perplexingly characterized as feedback to the queries issued by
the brain’’. Keep this slogan in mind as we consider another
famous slogan—from Kant—in what follows.
In the introduction to his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant
urges that if we are to make any progress on understanding
the relation between perception, cognition and external objects,
we need a fundamental shift in thinking. Kant introduces his
proposal by contrasting it with the ‘‘traditional’’ accounts of his
time (recall from above that this rhetorical strategy is used by
PP theorists when describing their accounts). ‘‘Thus far it has
been assumed that all our cognition must conform to objects’’
(Kant, 1996/1787, sec. B xvi). Here Kant is referring to the
theories of thinkers that came before him, which, he argues,
‘‘have come to nothing,’’ because they assume that sense organs
passively receive impressions stamped by external objects (Kant,
1996/1787, sec. B xvi). ‘‘Let us, therefore,’’ Kant proposes, ‘‘try
and find out by experiment whether we shall not make better
progress on the problems of metaphysics if we assume that objects
must conform to our cognition’’ (Kant, 1996/1787, sec. B xvi;
emphasis mine). By reversing our assumptions about the relation
between cognition and the objects of external perception, Kant
argues that we will be in a better position to understand how
the perceptual-cognitive system can possibly be as we experience
it. Kant claims that this position enables us to discover the
properties of the cognition that is being reverse-engineered,
‘‘i.e., a cognition that is to ascertain something about (objects)
before they are given to us’’ (Kant, 1996/1787, sec. B xvi). Kant
considered this reversal to be so crucial to our investigations
of perception and cognition that he immodestly claimed that it
would deliver results as monumental as the ideas of Copernicus
were for astronomy.
The situation here is the same as was that of Copernicus
when he first thought of explaining the motions of celestial
bodies. Having found it difficult to make progress there when
he assumed that the entire host of stars revolved around the
spectator, he tried to find out by experiment whether he might
not be more successful if he had the spectator revolve and
the stars remain at rest. Now, we can try a similar experiment
in metaphysics, with regard to our intuition of objects. If
our intuition had to conform to the character of its objects,
then I do not see how we could know anything a priori
about that character. But I can quite readily conceive of this
possibility if the object (as object of the senses) conforms
to the character of our power of intuition (Kant, 1996/1787,
sec. B xvii).
At this point, it should be clear that Kant’s call for a
‘‘Copernican’’ reversal of the traditional assumptions about
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perception anticipates the PP paradigm in important ways.
PP ‘‘profoundly reverses’’ (Hohwy, 2013, p. 47) traditional
assumptions about perception with its premise that ‘‘the world
only tells us things in the sense that it provides answers to the
questions we pose of it’’ (Hohwy, 2013, p. 225). Kant clearly
anticipates this when he advocates that we should ‘‘assume
that objects must conform to our cognition’’ (Kant, 1996/1787,
sec. B xvi). Kant’s slogan is echoed over 200 years later in
present-day language with Hohwy’s slogan that sensory input
is best conceived ‘‘as feedback to the queries issued by the
brain’’ (Hohwy, 2013, p. 2). Kant argued that his proposed shift
in thinking would herald a new era in our understanding of
perception and cognition. If a PP paradigm shapes up to be
the revolutionary shift that many fancy it to be (Clark, 2013;
Dennett, 2013; Hohwy, 2013; Madary, 2015; Purves et al., 2015),
then Kant’s ‘‘Copernican revolution’’ might finally be catching
on.
The ‘‘Copernican reversal’’ alone might prompt us to
nominate Kant as the early forefather of the PP paradigm, at
least with respect to this shared fundamental premise. Yet in the
following sections I present evidence that Kant proposed even
more specific theoretical ideas about perception and cognition
that are now emerging as scientific hypotheses within the PP
paradigm.
HYPERPRIORS AND KANT’s “FORMS OF
APPEARANCE”
As explained in the previous section, at the core of PP is
the proposal that the fundamental mechanisms of perception
involve something akin to (mostly unconscious) predictions,
and that percepts essentially are these predictions. To arrive at
predictions, brains require something on which these predictions
can be based—predictive systems require constraints on the set
of prior probabilities and likelihoods that should be taken into
account as they finalize and settle upon a set of predictions
for any given sensory-neural situation (Friston, 2003; Kemp
et al., 2007; Tenenbaum et al., 2011; Blokpoel et al., 2012;
Clark, 2013; Hohwy, 2013). Without such constraints, it is
impossible for any intelligent system to narrow down the
possibilities enough to settle on a single hypothesis or set
of hypotheses (Russell and Norvig, 2010; Tenenbaum et al.,
2011; Blokpoel et al., 2012). Linguists and developmental
psychologists tend to refer to these cognitive mechanisms as
‘‘constraints’’, while machine learning and artificial intelligence
researchers tend to use the term ‘‘inductive biases’’ (Tenenbaum
et al., 2011). In PP and Bayesian statistics literature, these
probabilistic constraints are known as ‘‘priors’’ (Tenenbaum
et al., 2011; Clark, 2013; Hohwy, 2013). While priors allow
inductive systems to select a single hypothesis from a larger
set of possible hypotheses (know as a ‘‘hypothesis space’’),
machine learning researchers have discovered that in order to
achieve the complex representational abilities found in human
cognition—from children to scientists—a hierarchical system
of priors is required (Kemp et al., 2007; Tenenbaum et al.,
2011; Clark, 2013). The key idea is that some priors in the
hierarchy are more abstract, so the system can leverage ‘‘not
just a single level of hypotheses to explain the data but multiple
levels: hypothesis spaces of hypothesis spaces, with priors on
priors’’ (Tenenbaum et al., 2011, p. 1282). Priors that are more
abstract and fundamental, the rest are often called ‘‘hyperpriors’’
(see Hohwy et al., 2008; Clark, 2013; Friston et al., 2013)
or ‘‘overhypotheses’’ (Goodman, 1983; Kemp et al., 2007).
A multilayered, bidirectional, recursive process of hypothesis
generation is a requirement addressed by hierarchical predictive
coding models of brain function, and hyperpriors are crucial
to such models (Friston and Kiebel, 2009; Blokpoel et al.,
2012).
Prime examples of hyperpriors in the predictive perceptual
system include the brute constraints imposed by space and
time—e.g., ‘‘that there is only one object (one cause of sensory
input) in one place, at a given scale, at a given moment,’’
or the fact that ‘‘we can only perform one action at a time,
choosing the left turn or the right but never both at once’’
(Clark, 2013, p. 196). Abstract internal knowledge of space
and time—spatial and temporal hyperpriors—are thought to
narrow and restrict large swaths of possible hypothesis spaces,
thereby aiding the formation of decisive perceptual predictions
regarding the external objects causing incoming stimuli (Clark,
2013). This narrowing of possible hypotheses is critical to the
entire probabilistic inference process—without it the required
Bayesian computations become intractable (Tenenbaum et al.,
2011; Blokpoel et al., 2012; Clark, 2013; Kwisthout, 2014).
Spatial and temporal hyperpriors can thus be usefully conceived
of as necessary conditions on the possibility of probabilistic
perceptions of external objects. Keep this in mind during the
following discussion of Kant’s account of the nature of space
and time.
Clark explicitly mentions Kant during a discussion of
hyperpriors. ‘‘Hyperpriors are essentially ‘‘priors upon priors’’
embodying systemic expectations concerning very abstract (at
times almost ‘‘Kantian’’) features of the world’’ (Clark, 2015a,
p. 174). Here is a rare instance in the PP literature where Kant
is invoked by name. But what exactly did Kant say that fits
this description of hyperpriors?2 In the section of Critique of
Pure Reason known as the ‘‘Transcendental Aesthetic’’, Kant
firmly distinguishes the ‘‘matter’’ of sensation from the ‘‘form’’
of sense experience (for an excellent overview see Hatfield,
2006). ‘‘Whatever in an appearance corresponds to sensation
I call its matter; but whatever in an appearance brings about
the fact that the manifold of the appearance can be ordered in
certain relations I call the form of appearance’’ (Kant, 1996/1787,
sec. A 20). Kant identifies two primal ‘‘forms’’ that shape the
‘‘matter’’ of sensation—namely, space and time. Importantly,
Kant insists that spatial and temporal properties are endogenous
features of cognition that impose formal constraints on the
possibility of any experience of outer objects (Kant, 1996/1787;
secs. B33–73; Hatfield, 2006). In other words, they are principles
of cognition which enable the experience of outer objects.
‘‘Space is an a priori presentation that necessarily underlies outer
appearances.’’ (Kant, 1996/1787, sec. B39).
2Clark doesn’t explain further, which is in part what motivated the present
article.
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Kant’s proposal that space and time are features of cognition
that form, constrain and restrict possible perceptions of outer
objects is echoed in explanations of the role of hyperpriors
in PP accounts of perception. Without spatial and temporal
hyperpriors, the objects of perception that putatively result from
PP would be impossible (Tenenbaum et al., 2011; Blokpoel
et al., 2012). This is much like Kant’s position that space and
time are features of cognition that constrain the possibility of
the experience of outer objects, and may be similar to Clark’s
description of hyperpriors as evoking ‘‘an almost ‘‘Kantian’’ feel’’
(Clark, 2013, p. 196). Clark even echoes Kant’s use of the word
formal. ‘‘The use of such a representational form would amount
to the deployment of an implicit formal hyperprior (formal,
because it concerns the form of the probabilistic representation
itself). . .’’ (Clark, 2013, p. 196; emphasis mine).
Kant’s famous and controversial conclusion is that space and
time should not be conceived as external-world properties,
but rather as internal structures that constrain possible
perceptions—essentially stating that space and time are
‘‘idealistic’’ (Hatfield, 2006). But does PP actually posit that
space and time are structures of perceptual systems rather than
external real-world properties? Certainly many PP theorists will
stop short of going this far ‘‘out there’’. However, PP lends plenty
of support to Kant’s conception of space and time. When taken
together, the following two PP proposals—(1) perceptions are
the predictions brains make about current sensory stimulation;
and (2) spatial and temporal hyperpriors form and shape all
perceptions of external objects—sound a lot like Kant’s claim
that space and time are best thought of as originating, not from
the ‘‘matter’’ of outer sensation, but rather from endogenous
formal constraints on any perception of outer objects. While
this potentially radical claim is not (yet) openly stated in current
PP literature, some recent related work in cognitive science
advances a similar line. For example, Hoffman and Prakash
(2014, p. 20) conclude that ‘‘objects and space-time are simply
species-specific perceptual adaptations’’ and Purves et al. (2015,
p. 1) argue that our common assumption that perception delivers
objective features of real-world properties should be replaced
‘‘with a paradigm in which perceptions reflect biological utility
based on past experience rather than objective features of the
environment’’. This recent trend in neuroscience echoes Kant’s
insistence that perception delivers only ‘‘appearances’’ and not
‘‘things-in-themselves,’’ as well as his doctrine that space and
time are formal aspects of cognitive-perceptual systems and not
objective features of external reality.
Kant considered his ‘‘forms of sensibility’’ so important that
he proposed a new field of science to be devoted entirely
to their investigation. ‘‘There must, therefore, be a science
of all principles of a priori sensibility. I call such a science
transcendental aesthetic’’ (Kant, 1996/1787, sec. A 20). Perhaps
PP is answering Kant’s call for a science of transcendental
aesthetic?
A NOTE ABOUT THE A PRIORI
At this point I would like to highlight an important difference
between Kant’s accounts and those found in PP. Kant was
primarily concerned with explaining a priori features of
perception and cognition. He did not focus on the empirical
acquisition of priors, he lacked evolutionary understanding, and
he did not set out theories of learning. This creates a prima
facie tension for comparisons between Kant and PP, since PP
places emphasis on learned priors, ‘‘empirical Bayes’’, and the
idea that organisms perceive using probabilistic computations
based on prior experience. However, this apparent tension
might be dissolved if we keep in mind that PP is not a
traditional ‘‘empiricist’’ theory, for it recognizes that many
priors could be innate and biologically hard-wired (Clark,
2013), even if such wirings are ultimately the result of long-
term phylogenetic experience. This conception of a priori
seems to be in line with what Friedman describes as a
‘‘relativized and dynamical conception of a priori mathematical-
physical principles, which change and develop. . . but which
nevertheless retain the characteristically Kantian constitutive
function of making the empirical natural knowledge thereby
structured and framed by such knowledge possible’’ (Friedman,
2000, p. 370; see also Reichenbach, 1965). In a similar vein,
Kitcher argues that what might seem to us to be a priori
mathematical truth actually depend on ‘‘the experiences of those
who came before us in the mathematical tradition’’ (Kitcher,
2000, p. 84).
Since Kant ‘‘uses ‘‘necessary’’ and ‘‘a priori’’ interchangeably’’
(Kitcher, 1980, p. 89; see also Kripke, 1972), we can compare
Kant’s ‘‘necessary conditions’’ with the necessity of certain priors
as outlined by PP without worrying about potential discrepancies
that might arise from differing accounts regarding the exact
nature and origin of a priori knowledge. Philosophers in general
are far from certain about the relation between a priori and other
notions, such as experience, innateness, nativism, rationalism,
empiricism and so on (see Boghossian and Peacocke, 2000).
Therefore, the fact that Kant and PP differ on their conception
about the nature and origin of a priori structures in perceptual-
cognitive systems does not preclude meaningful conceptual
connections between Kant and PP, especially with regard to their
accounts of the functional role of a priori principles.
GENERATIVE MODELS AND KANT’s
SCHEMATA
The problem of perceptual object recognition—how organisms
are able to isolate meaningful objects from noisy and chaotic
perceptual scenes—is a longstanding puzzle in philosophy
as well as in the cognitive sciences. One way to study
how biological brains recognize objects is to try to build
artificial systems capable of object recognition and then look
for the required design principles in brains (Griffiths et al.,
2010). Early ‘‘connectionist’’ work in machine learning made
important progress toward this effort, yet still ‘‘struggled to
show appropriate representations in a deep multilayer context,
and required large bodies of pre-classified data to power
learning’’ (Clark, 2015b, p. 27). Operating largely on principles
of weighted association and habit formation (fire together, wire
together), these artificial systems proved unable to match the
human ability to apply perceptual concepts and to recognize
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objects in a general way. ‘‘People learning new concepts can
often generalize successfully from just a single example, yet
machine learning algorithms typically require tens or hundreds
of examples to perform with similar accuracy’’ (Lake et al., 2015,
p. 1332).
To address this challenge, researchers in computer vision,
machine learning and computational neuroscience have
proposed that generative models might be central to solving
the problem of perceptual object recognition and concept
application (Dayan et al., 1995; Kersten et al., 2004; Friston, 2005;
Hinton, 2007a,b; Clark, 2013). Generative models ‘‘capture the
statistical structure of some set of observed inputs by inferring
a causal matrix able to give rise to that very structure’’ (Clark,
2015a, p. 21). In other words, a system that uses generative
models can estimate the causes of incoming sensations (and thus
recognize objects) by leveraging its own ability to produce similar
sensations internally. The key idea is that incoming sensory
stimuli are ‘‘carved up’’, not by comparing them to a database of
previously encountered images, but rather by comparing them to
more general endogenous ‘‘rules’’ (generative models) and then
selecting (inferring) the model that is most likely able to generate
the input patterns. In a hierarchical generative model, an upper
layer is capable of producing—and thereby predicting—the
activity patterns of the layer below. For perceptual systems,
this means ‘‘that the model at layer N + 1 becomes capable of
generating the sensory data (i.e., the input as it would there be
represented at layer N (the layer below)) for itself’’ (Clark, 2015b,
p. 26).
The generative model approach describes object recognition
as a coordinated balance of both ‘‘top-down’’ and ‘‘bottom-
up’’ flows of neural signals. The top-down signals instantiate a
generative model—a matrix of possible causal structure—which
‘‘predicts’’ the causes of current sensations as it flows
downward along the ‘‘backwards’’ or ‘‘feedback’’ anatomical
neural pathways. Simultaneous with this top-down generation
of predictions is a bottom-up neural signal flow against which
the predictions are ‘‘matched’’ or ‘‘checked’’ (sometimes called a
‘‘recognition model’’) and which flows along the ‘‘feedforward’’
neural connections (Kersten et al., 2004; Friston, 2005; Clark,
2013; Hohwy, 2013). There are many important details to
this process, but the key point here is that theories of object
recognition based on generative models involve both a top-down
pass (endogenously generated from upper layers of the neural
hierarchy) as well as a bottom-up pass (originating from lower
layers of the neural hierarchy and ultimately from transduction
at the external sense organ). The success of generative models in
artificial perception, combined with the fact that the biological
anatomy of brains boasts a neural architecture poised to
support the types of connections required by generative models
(Mumford, 1992; Friston, 2005; Yuille and Kersten, 2006; Clark,
2013), has motivated the proposal that brains recognize objects
by way of a neurally-implemented top-down/bottom-up process
involving generative models.
Crucial to the generative model solution to the problem of
object perception is the ‘‘productive function’’ of the biological
(or artificial) brain—its ability to endogenously generate sensory
patterns. An artificial neural network based on generative models
develops its own pattern-recognition abilities, not merely by
habits of weighting and associating external stimuli, but by
‘‘dreaming’’, using a ‘‘wake-sleep algorithm’’, in which the system
learns how to generate the patterns, for itself, by ‘‘imagining’’
different sorts of possible patterns ‘‘in fantasy’’3. The knowledge
of how to generate patterns is then used in order to recognize
incoming patterns. ‘‘Here, instead of attempting to directly train
a (synthetic) neural network to classify images, the network
first learns to generate such images for itself’’ (Clark, 2015b,
p. 27). Such a system then attempts to analyze and classify
incoming stimuli, not by simply checking them against a database
of previously-encountered images, but rather by identifying the
endogenous rules or ‘‘imagination procedures’’ that it would use
to generate the incoming stimuli for itself. This strategy provides
a basis for achieving generalized perceptual concepts that are
less confined to particular token instances, which has recently
been demonstrated to match human performance on character
recognition tasks (Lake et al., 2015). Hence Hinton’s (2007a) title
‘‘To Recognize Shapes, First Learn to Generate Images.’’
Kant outlined a novel theory of perceptual object recognition
and concept application4, which he called ‘‘schematism’’ (Kant,
1996/1787, sec. A 137). Kant’s schematism anticipates the
generative model strategy in two major ways. Kant claims that:
(1) object recognition requires a top-down generative process
akin to imagination, in addition to a bottom-up sensory input
flow and (2) that mind must classify perceptual objects, not
by associating and comparing them to a set of previously
encountered images, but rather by identifying the endogenous
abstract rules it would use to generate the sensory patterns in
imagination5.
Kant’s schematism arose from his dissatisfaction with the
association-based habit-formation theories of object recognition
of his contemporaries, much as generative models address
the shortcomings of association-based connectionist approaches
in machine learning and cognitive science. Kant argued that
there were unacceptable limitations in the empiricist accounts
of perceptual object recognition (primarily Hume and Locke)
due in part to their appeal to laws of habit and association
(Kant, 1996/1787; Hatfield, 1990). Kant does acknowledge
that association and habit play an important role, which he
called the ‘‘empirical laws of imagination,’’ grouped under the
‘‘reproductive function of the imagination’’ (Kant, 1996/1787,
sec. A 120–122; emphasis mine). Yet he objected to claims that
such ‘‘reproductive’’ principles were sufficient to explain the
generalization abilities of human perceptual object recognition.
In objecting to this strategy, Kant accurately anticipates the
‘‘generalization problem’’ that has hampered connectionist
approaches in machine learning. ‘‘No image whatever of a
triangle would ever be adequate to the concept of a triangle
as such. For it would never reach the concept’s universality
3Clark (2015a) reports a handful of such references to ‘‘imagination’’ in
generative model-based computer vision and machine learning techniques.
4Kant proposed that both ‘‘empirical concepts’’ (perceptual/sensory
concepts) as well as ‘‘pure concepts’’ (abstract cognition) required schemata.
5Perlovsky et al. (2011) present their own computational model of concepts
and object recognition, which they explicitly identify with Kant on similar
grounds.
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that makes the concept hold for all triangles (whether right-
angled or oblique-angled, etc.), but would always be limited to
only part of this set’’ (Kant, 1996/1787, sec. A 141). Images
of objects derived from experience—even complex clusters of
associations of images—are never ‘‘adequate to the empirical
concept.’’ Kant argued that, in order for perceptual concepts
to take hold on incoming stimuli, a ‘‘third thing’’ must
mediate the connection. ‘‘This mediating presentation must
be pure. . . and yet must be both intellectual, on the one
hand, and sensible, on the other hand. Such a presentation
is the transcendental schema’’ (Kant, 1996/1787, sec. A 138).
This statement anticipates the top-down/bottom-up interplay of
the generative model strategy. Furthermore, like a generative
model, ‘‘a schema is, in itself, always only a product of the
imagination. . . a rule for the synthesis of imagination regarding
pure shapes in space’’ (Kant, 1996/1787, sec. A 140–141). For
Kant, evaluating perceptual stimuli using a ‘‘rule for synthesis’’
is the only way to avoid the generalization problem that comes
with image association and matching strategies. ‘‘Images must
always be connected with the concept only by means of the
schema that they designate; in themselves the images are never
completely congruent with the concept’’ (Kant, 1996/1787,
sec. A 142).
In a recent demonstration of the power of the generative
model paradigm, Lake et al. (2015) present an algorithm that
can match human performance in a perceptual recognition
task involving the identification of handwritten characters. In
their approach, each handwritten character is represented in
the system, not as an image of that character, but rather as
‘‘an abstract schema of parts, subparts and relations’’ (Lake
et al., 2015, p. 1333; emphasis mine). This abstract schema
takes the form of a mini-program, a set of instructions or
rules for generating images of alphabet characters. ‘‘The model
represents concepts as simple programs that best explain
observed examples. . .’’ (Lake et al., 2015, p. 1332). To recognize
incoming stimuli as alphabet characters, the system leverages its
own capabilities for generating images, an approach they term
‘‘probabilistic program induction’’ (Lake et al., 2015, p. 1332).
This is very much in line with how Kant explained the role
of schemata—a ‘‘concept always refers directly to the schema of
imagination’’ (Kant, 1996/1787, sec. A 141)—though of course
he did not conceptualize schemata as computer programs.
However, Eco (2000) as well as Marconi (2003) both argue
that Kant’s schemata can usefully be compared to procedural
computer programs, and that they bear general resemblance
to certain artificial intelligence strategies6. Moreover, Perlovsky
et al. (2011) acknowledge and emphasize the Kantian roots of
top-down model-based computational approaches to cognition
and object recognition7. Kant’s schemata are the ‘‘third thing’’
that bridge concepts, on the one hand, with images, on the other,
by being ‘‘homogenous’’ with both—they do this in virtue of their
capacity as generic procedural rules for creating different types of
6Neither Eco nor Marconi seem to have been aware of the idea of a generative
model when they compared Kant’s schemata to computer procedures.
7Perlovsky et al. (2011) do not discuss Kant’s schematism in comparison with
computational approaches.
FIGURE 1 | First appeared in Gregory (1970).
structured sensory patterns (Kant, 1996/1787, sec. B 176). With
his theory of schemata, Kant clearly anticipates a core part of the
general strategy as found, for example, in the recent work of Lake
et al. (2015). ‘‘In fact, it is schemata, not images of objects, that lie
at the basis of our pure sensible concepts’’ (Kant, 1996/1787, sec.
A 141).
Yuille and Kersten (2006), in one of the first articles to
articulate a generative model strategy for problems in vision
research, use a well-known example of an ambiguous black-and-
white image (Figure 1), in which most people can, initially, see
only random patches.
‘‘Low-level cues for this image contain little evidence to
activate a high-level dog model, and so naive subjects take a long
time to detect the dog’’ (Yuille and Kersten, 2006, p. 302; see
also Mumford, 1992) (The image contains a Dalmatian dog in
a ‘‘drinking’’ pose). For many subjects, the dog becomes salient
only after verbal prompts, after which it remains unavoidably
salient. To explain this phenomenon, the authors advance
the proposal that brains leverage top-down processing using
generative models in order to achieve object recognition.
To explain how schemata are the key to picking out objects
from within a noisy manifold of sensible intuitions, Kant uses
his own dog example! ‘‘The concept dog specifies a rule whereby
my imagination can trace the shape of such a four-footed animal
in a general way, i.e., without being limited to any single and
particular shape offered to me by experience, or even to all
possible images that I can exhibit in concreto.’’ (Kant, 1996/1787,
sec. A 141). Kant claims that schemata enable us to isolate an
object from the sensory barrage and identify it as an animal which
falls under the empirical concept dog8.
Thus, at least from the standpoint of a high-level comparison,
generative models seem to fit Kant’s idea of schemata, from
the general strategy right down to the illustrative examples.
8For more fun discussion of imagination, perception and recognizing dogs,
see Strawson (1970) and Eco (2000).
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Clark even invokes the adverb ‘‘schematically’’ when explaining
how a generative model ‘‘aims to capture the statistical
structure of some set of observed inputs by tracking (one
might say, by schematically recapitulating) the causal matrix
responsible for that very structure’’ (Clark, 2013, p. 182; emphasis
mine).
Kant cryptically comments that the full workings of schemata
might forever remain mysterious to science. ‘‘The schematism
of our understanding, i.e., its schematism regarding appearances
and their mere form, is a secret art residing in the depths of
the human soul, an art whose true stratagems we shall hardly
ever divine from nature and lay bare before ourselves’’ (Kant,
1996/1787, sec. B 181). If I am on the right track linking Kant’s
schemata to generative models, then perhaps PP reveals some of
the ‘‘true stratagems’’ locked inside of the ‘‘secret art’’ of Kant’s
notoriously mysterious schemata9.
ANALYSIS-BY-SYNTHESIS
Central to the secret art of generative models is a strategy known
as ‘‘analysis-by-synthesis’’. It is so-called because, as described
above, the incoming sensations are analyzed by comparing
them to the internal processes that could synthesize similar
patterns endogenously. ‘‘We recognize objects and states of
affairs, if these approaches are correct, by finding the most
likely set of interacting factors (distal causes) whose combination
would generate (hence predicts, and best accounts for) the
incoming sensory data’’ (Clark, 2015a, p. 21). PP stresses that
the generation of a structured scene always occurs with limited
informational resources—information limited to that which
is available from perspective of the organism (Clark’s ‘‘view
from inside the black box’’, or Hohwy’s ‘‘skull-bound brain’’).
Predictive brains leverage generative models to infer the ‘‘hidden
causes’’ of the energetic stimulation occurring to the sense
organs. ‘‘When the combination of such hidden causes (which
span many spatial and temporal scales) settles into a coherent
whole, the system has self-generated the sensory data using
stored knowledge and perceives a meaningful, structured scene’’
(Clark, 2015a, p. 21; emphasis mine).
Kant placed great emphasis on a mental process that he called
‘‘synthesis’’ throughout CPR10. ‘‘By synthesis, in the most general
sense of the term, I mean the act of putting various presentations
with one another and of comprising their manifoldness in
one cognition’’ (Kant, 1996/1787, sec. B 103). Kant introduces
his technical definition of this term by connecting it at the
outset with the activity of imagination and by stressing its
crucial role in perception and cognition. ‘‘Synthesis as such,
as we shall see hereafter, is the mere effect produced by the
imagination. . . without which we would have no cognition
9In his article ‘‘Why cognitive science needs philosophy and vice versa,
philosopher of science Paul Thagard argues that cognitive science does need
philosophy, ‘‘but it does not need most styles of philosophy. . . although there
may be occasional theoretical ideas such as Kant’s theory of schemas and
Frege’s theory of relations that prove scientifically useful’’ (Thagard, 2009,
p. 249; emphasis mine).
10We should exercise caution when discussing Kant’s use of the term
‘‘synthesis’’, as he used it in (at least) two distinct ways. See Kitcher (1996,
p. xliv) for important clarifications.
whatsoever. . .’’ (Kant, 1996/1787, sec. A 78). Kant immediately
contrasts synthesis with analysis and importantly, claims that: (1)
synthesis is required for analysis; therefore (2) synthesis should
be the primary target of any investigation about the fundamental
workings of cognition.
Before any analysis of our presentations can take place, these
presentations must first be given, and hence in terms of content
no concepts can originate analytically. Rather, synthesis of a
manifold (whether this manifold is given empirically or a priori)
is what first gives rise to a cognition. Although this cognition may
still be crude and confused at first and hence may require analysis,
yet synthesis is what in fact gathers the elements for cognition
and unites them to (form) a certain content. Hence if we want to
make a judgment about the first origin of our cognition, then we
must first direct our attention to synthesis (Kant, 1996/1787, sec.
B 103).
Kant goes on to offer an elaborate account of three
distinct stages of synthesis (‘‘threefold synthesis’’), along with a
distinction between ‘‘pure’’ and ‘‘empirical’’ varieties of synthesis.
I will not address such details here, however, because I am only
arguing that Kant and PP share the fundamental proposal that
analysis (the use concepts in sensation and cognition) proceeds
by way of synthesis (the combining and ordering of sense data
using what Kant calls the productive capacity of the imagination
and its schemata).
IMAGINATION AND PERCEPTION
Imagination plays a key role in the PP framework as it seems
to be the engine that allows generative models to facilitate
perceptions. Kant’s framework places imagination in a similar
position.
Imagination is the power of presenting an object in intuition
even without the objects being present. Now, all our intuition
is sensible; and hence the imagination, because of the subjective
condition under which alone it can give to the concepts of
understanding a corresponding intuition, belongs to sensibility.
Yet the synthesis of imagination is an exercise of spontaneity,
which is determinative, rather than merely determinable, as is
sense; hence this synthesis can a priori determine sense in terms
of its form in accordance with the unity of apperception. To
this extent, therefore, the imagination is a power of determining
sensibility a priori; and its synthesis of intuitions in accordance
with the categories must be the transcendental synthesis of
imagination. This synthesis is an action of the understanding
upon sensibility, and is the understanding’s first application
(and at the same time the basis of all its other applications) to
objects of the intuition that is possible for us (Kant, 1996/1787,
sec. B152).
Kant argued tirelessly that imagination is the key to synthesis,
and that synthesis lies at the basis of both perception and
understanding. In discussing this aspect of Kant in the context
of computational neuroscience Perlovsky et al. (2011, p. 86) state
that ‘‘pattern recognition and artificial intelligence algorithms of
recent past would not know how to relate to this.’’ In a footnote,
Kant himself speculates on why the psychologists of his time did
not recognize the key role of imagination in their accounts of
perception.
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That the imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception
itself has, I suppose, never occurred to any psychologist. This is
so partly because this power has been limited by psychologists
to reproduction only, and partly because they believed that the
senses not only supply us with impressions, but indeed also
assemble these impressions and thus bring about images of
objects. But this undoubtedly requires something more than our
receptivity for impressions, viz., a function for their synthesis
(Kant, 1996/1787, sec. A 120 n).
If Kant were writing today, he could not claim that the
tight connection between imagination and perception has ‘‘never
occurred to any psychologist,’’ because the psychologists who
leverage PP-style theories are saying exactly this11. Dreams and
mental imagery have played a role in PP theories since early
formulations of top-down/bottom-up models of cortical activity
(Mumford, 1992; Friston, 2005). For PP, imagination is the
architecture by which generative models ‘‘generate’’ and produce
predictive perceptions. This means that imagination is in some
ways required for perception. ‘‘It means that perception (at least,
as it occurs in creatures like us), is co-emergent with (something
quite like) imagination’’ (Clark, 2015b, p. 26).
As we reflect on the tight kinship between PP and Kant, we
might arrive at the following question. Why are Kant’s ideas
seemingly reincarnated in contemporary PP theory? It is unlikely
that the neuroscientists developing PP frameworks have drawn
direct inspiration from deep readings in Kant’s Critique of Pure
Reason. So are the links I have presented here the result of mere
coincidence? Indirect influence? Or can they be traced directly to
Kant through the influence of Helmholtz?
PREDICTIVE PROCESSING, HELMHOLTZ
AND KANT
The current PP paradigm emerged from early work on
generative models, and this early work explicitly identifies
itself as being directly inspired by the work of 19th century
German scientist Hermann von Helmholtz (1821–1894). For
example, the seminal article on the use of generative models in
machine perception, titled ‘‘The Helmholtz Machine,’’ states that
‘‘Following Helmholtz, we view the human perceptual system
as a statistical inference engine whose function is to infer the
probable causes of sensory input’’ (Dayan et al., 1995, p. 889).
Homage to Helmholtz is also given in early proposals of vision
as Bayesian inference, where ‘‘vision is treated as an inverse
inference problem, in the spirit of Helmholtz, where the goal is
to estimate the factors that have generated the image’’ (Yuille
and Kersten, 2006, p. 301). The ‘‘free energy principle’’—a far-
reaching PP model of the entire nervous system developed
by Friston et al. (2006)—is introduced with the claim that ‘‘if
one formulates Helmholtz’s ideas about perception in terms
of modern-day theories one arrives at a model of perceptual
11The central role of imagination is also recognized by computational
neuroscientists outside of PP, such as Perlovski, who emphasizes that his
theories of dynamic logic and neural modeling fields, as well as Carpenter and
Grossberg’s (1999) adaptive resonance model ‘‘both describe imagination as
an inseparable part of thinking’’. (Perlovsky et al., 2011, p. 86).
inference and learning that can explain a remarkable range of
neurobiological facts’’ (Friston and Stephan, 2007, p. 417). More
recent overviews of PP also identify Helmholtz as the ancestral
precedent of the overall PP paradigm (Bubic et al., 2010; Friston,
2012; Clark, 2013; Hohwy, 2013).
Core PP ideas pioneered by Helmholtz include the central
idea that percepts are akin to (mostly unconscious) ‘‘inferences’’,
the notion that perception might involve a process analogous
to scientific induction, and the understanding of illusions as
‘‘optimal percepts’’ that are generated based on the most likely
causes of sensations (Helmholtz, 1925). Helmholtz also tackled
the issue of what is now termed ‘‘top-down’’ cognitive influence
on perception, stating that ‘‘we cannot altogether avoid speaking
of the mental processes that are active in the sense-perceptions
if we wish to see clearly the connection between the phenomena
and to arrange the facts in their proper relation to one another’’
(Helmholtz, 1925, p. 2). Helmholtz then immediately states that
Kant articulated the proper relation between mental processes
and perceptual processes. ‘‘The keenest thinkers, philosophers
like Kant for instance, have long ago analyzed these relations
correctly and demonstrated them. . .’’ (Helmholtz, 1925, p. 2).
This respectful reference to philosophy—and to Kant in
particular—is a consistent theme in Helmholtz. He took
philosophy very seriously and published several philosophical
works over the course of his scientific career, throughout
which there is ‘‘frequent insistence on his Kantian ancestry’’
(Hatfield, 1990, p. 169). Helmholtz declared himself to be
a ‘‘faithful Kantian,’’ and believed that he was providing a
scientific implementation and ‘‘operationalization’’ of Kant’s
epistemology and (anti-) metaphysics (Hatfield, 1990; Lenoir,
2006). Helmholtz saw his work as remaining true to Kant’s
epistemological project, and even explained how his scientific
theories of perception provided important revisions to certain
conclusions made by Kant (Hatfield, 1990; Lenoir, 2006).
‘‘Helmholtz thus considered himself more consistently Kantian
than Kant had been himself’’ (Lenoir, 2006, p. 141).
If we consider the fact that PP is widely seen as a
contemporary formulation of the work of Helmholtz, taken
together with the fact that Helmholtz embraced Kant’s
philosophy, the links between PP and Kant should not come as
a surprise. In this regard, PP can even be seen as a major step
in the evolution of Kant’s transcendental psychology. Helmholtz
brought the ideas of Kant to the table as he developed scientific
theories of the psychology and physiology of perception, and the
PP paradigm is now bringing the theories of Helmholtz—and
thus the ideas of Kant—into contemporary neuroscience and
machine learning research. The links between Kant and PP that
I defend in this article seem much less mysterious when we keep
in mind the fact that PP is part of a Kantian lineage inherited
directly from Helmholtz.
CONCLUSIONS
Prompted by Hume’s questioning of the origin of causal structure
in percepts, Kant applied his top-down analytical method to
reverse-engineer cognition and perception. From the start of
his endeavor, Kant maintained that, if we are to make any
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progress, we must first invert the traditional account of the
relation between the structure of cognition and the objects
presented in outer perception, so that we ‘‘instead assume
that objects must conform to our cognition’’ (Kant, 1996/1787,
sec. B xvi). Proceeding from this initial premise, Kant then
developed an elaborate model of perception and cognition
that proposed many novel concepts and specific theoretical
components. The components of Kant’s system discussed in the
present treatment include the proposal that space and time are
formal structures of perceptual-cognitive processes necessary for
outer perception; that external perception and object recognition
is made possible by chains of endogenous procedural rules
capable of generating mental imagery; that cognitive-perceptual
understanding proceeds according to alternating iterative steps
of analysis and synthesis; and that ‘‘imagination is a necessary
ingredient of perception itself’’ (Kant, 1996/1787, sec. A 120 n).
As I have shown in this article, PP proposes an account
of perception and cognition that echoes these core aspects of
Kant in specific ways. This, of course, is not to say that all of
PP is ‘‘Kantian’’ or in complete agreement with Kant’s entire
transcendental philosophy. PP’s probabilistic and evolutionary
approach (not to mention its computational and neuroscientific
underpinnings) goes beyond Kant’s insights in ways that Kant
could not have imagined. Indeed, operationalizing Kant was
Helmholtz’s explicit intent for his work on perception, much like
the intent of PP has been to enhance the insights of Helmholtz
with a modern neurocomputational and probabilistic toolset.
All of this comparison to Kant prompts an important
question: Is it even possible to arrive at a formulation of PP
that avoids these Kantian aspects? Or does PP by its very nature
entail a Kant-style conception of perception, cognition, and their
relation to the external world?
It is my hope that the links between PP and Kant defended in
this article will persuade PP theorists that Kant’s work is directly
relevant to the historical context of PP, and perhaps even hint
that further important insights might await those who embark
on PP-savvy readings of Kant. Some cognitive scientists already
attest to the usefulness of Kant’s ideas within neuroscience and
artificial systems research (Marconi, 2003; Perlovsky et al., 2011;
Fazelpour and Thompson, 2015). Others will object that dabbling
in the metaphysics of long-gone philosophers (especially Kant) is
not a wise way to move forward within neuroscience. However,
here I am in agreement with Edelman (2012, p. 3), who
states that philosophy—especially history of philosophy—has an
important role to play in ‘‘sharpening psychology’s theoretical
tools by focusing on its conceptual foundations in a broad
perspective, which includes philosophical considerations and
indeed, metaphysics. . .’’.
Kant scholars might likewise benefit from PP-informed
readings of Kant. Clark argues that PP represents ‘‘a genuine
departure from many of our previous ways of thinking about
perception, cognition, and the human cognitive architecture’’
(Clark, 2013, p. 187). The historical links presented in this
article might call Clark’s claim into question. However, I would
argue that, in spite of being anticipated by Kant, PP nonetheless
represents a ‘‘genuine departure’’ as Clark words it, because
Kant’s work on perception and cognition never really caught on
within psychology. Kant’s psychology, which has been called ‘‘the
dark side of the critique,’’ has been deemed shameful by many
20th century analytic philosophers (Kitcher, 1993, p. 3). Many
attempts have been made to ‘‘salvage’’ Kant’s ‘‘austere’’ ideas
from the ‘‘incomprehensible’’ arguments of his transcendental
psychology (Bennett, 1966; Strawson, 1966; Wolff, 1970; Guyer,
1987; Allison, 2004). ‘‘Powerful currents within and without Kant
scholarship have combined to keep transcendental psychology
out of the mainstream, beyond the pale of serious philosophical
discussion’’ (Kitcher, 1993, p. 5). Much of cognitive science
has reflected this aversion to Kant-style frameworks, readily
evidenced by the preponderance of bottom-up, feedforward
models of brain activity. ‘‘Neuroscientific studies of structural
and functional brain connectivity in the past two decades,
however, provide strong support for a view of the mind much
closer to that which Kant envisioned’’ (Fazelpour and Thompson,
2015). If PP proves to be an important advance for cognitive
science, and if the links to Kant discussed here hold up, then this
will support the perspective of Kitcher and Hatfield that ‘‘it is not
crazy to take Kant’s psychology seriously’’ (Kitcher, 1993, p. vii).
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